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本文分析了在知识链组织研究与开发协作中,基础阶段的研究由代理组织承担,应用开发阶段的创新由核心企业完成的投入决策过程。研究表明:在序贯博弈情形下,核心企业所获得的收益越多,基础研究阶段的投入产出的弹性系数越高,核心企业对代理组织的补贴越多;核心企业和代理组织在合作博弈情形下比序贯博弈情形下所投入的研发费用更多;此外,合作博弈所产生的创新收益增量部分的合作租金的分配比例与风险厌恶程度负相关,与讨价还价能力无关,合作租金的溢价补贴部分与风险规避程度、讨价还价能力同时相关。
This paper analyzes that in the collaborative research and development of knowledge chain organization, the research on the basic stage is undertaken by the agency organization, and the application and development stage is completed by the core enterprise. The research shows that in the case of sequential game, the more revenue the core enterprise gains, the higher the elasticity coefficient of the input and output in the basic research stage, and the more the core enterprises subsidize the agency organization. The more the core enterprises and agency organizations play in the cooperation game In the case of sequential games, more research and development costs are devoted to the case. In addition, the proportion of cooperative rent distribution in incremental part of cooperative game is negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion and has nothing to do with bargaining power. The premium of cooperative rent Part of the subsidy and risk aversion, bargaining power at the same time related.