供应和需求的不确定会影响供应链的有效运作。本文基于惩罚和收益共享联合契约对由单个生产商、分销商和零售商构成的三级供应链协调问题进行了研究。研究表明,在惩罚契约状态下,供应的不确定性得到了降低,且生产商和分销商的收益均得到了提高;在收益共享契约状态下,分销商和零售商的收益均得到了提高,但无法降低供应的不确定性;在惩罚和收益共享联合契约下,不但提高了供应的可能性,同时也减弱了需求的不确定性,供应链整体收益及各成员收益均得到了提高。 Uncertainty in supply and demand can affect the effective operation of the supply chain. Based on the joint contract of punishment and revenue sharing, this paper studies the coordination problem of three-level supply chain composed of single producers, distributors and retailers. The research shows that in the state of punitive contract, the uncertainty of supply has been reduced and the profits of producers and distributors have been improved. In the state of revenue-sharing contract, the returns of distributors and retailers have been increased, But can not reduce the uncertainty of supply. Under the joint penalty and revenue sharing contract, it not only increases the possibility of supply, but also reduces the uncertainty of demand. As a result, the overall revenue of the supply chain and the income of all members have been raised.