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尽管研发外包可以降低研发投资风险,然而,由于信息泄漏会侵蚀企业部分市场份额,因而企业在进行研发决策时面临着内部研发和研发外包之间的权衡。鉴于此,本文构建一个信息泄漏情形下企业研发决策的博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析企业研发策略的动态均衡,并对参数进行数值模拟分析,以此揭示信息泄漏对企业研发决策的影响机理。结果表明:信息泄漏对企业市场份额的侵蚀程度对企业研发决策行为的演化产生至关重要的影响。本文对各种演化情形进行了详细地分析和阐述,可以为企业研发决策提供参考。
Although R & D outsourcing can reduce R & D investment risk, enterprises face the trade-off between R & D outsourcing and R & D decisions because information leakage will erode some of the enterprise’s market share. In view of this, this paper constructs a game model of enterprise R & D decision under the situation of information leakage, analyzes the dynamic equilibrium of R & D strategy by using evolutionary game theory, and conducts numerical simulation analysis of parameters to reveal the impact mechanism of information leakage on R & D decision. The result shows that the degree of information leakage on the market share of enterprises has an important impact on the evolution of corporate decision-making behavior. This article has carried on the detailed analysis and the elaboration to each kind of evolution situation, may provide the reference for the enterprise R & D decision-making.