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基于代理成本视角的现金股利政策理论已得到越来越多的关注。传统的股利代理理论认为,支付现金股利能降低股东与经理人之间的代理成本,但有可能导致股东和债权人之间产生利益冲突。研究发现,股权集中情况下,支付现金股利也是降低控股股东与外部中小股东之间利益冲突的手段,但基于我国上市公司的研究结果表明,过度支付现金股利反而增加了控股股东与外部中小股东之间代理成本。
The theory of cash dividend policy based on agency cost has drawn more and more attention. The traditional dividend agency theory holds that paying cash dividends can reduce the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but may lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. The research shows that paying cash dividends is also a means to reduce the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and the outside small and medium shareholders under the condition of ownership concentration. However, based on the research of the listed companies in our country, the over-payment of cash dividend increases the controlling shareholders and the external minority shareholders Inter-agency costs.