论文部分内容阅读
以2011年10月底北京首次发生的“PM2.5爆表”事件为背景,选取重污染企业为实验组,非重污染企业为对照组,采用修正的Jones模型和双重差分模型检验政治成本骤然上升的重污染企业:(1)是否会为了规避政治成本而进行向下的盈余管理;(2)进行盈余管理后是否能得到更多政府补助。研究表明:与非重污染企业相比,重污染企业在“PM2.5爆表”事件后进行了显著向下的盈余管理,但并没有因此获得更多的政府补助,说明政府的补助决策具有一定的理性。
Taking the “PM2.5 explosion table” incident first occurred in Beijing in the end of October 2011 as the background, the heavily polluting enterprises were selected as experimental group and non-heavily polluting enterprises as control group. The modified Jones model and double difference model were used to test the political costs Suddenly rising heavy polluting enterprises: (1) Whether to carry out downward earnings management in order to avoid political costs; (2) Whether to obtain more government subsidies after earnings management. The research shows that compared with non-heavily-polluting enterprises, heavily-polluting enterprises carried out a significant downward-oriented earnings management after the “PM2.5 explosion” incident, but did not get more government subsidies, indicating that government subsidies Decision-making has some rationality.