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众筹作为舶来品进入中国市场以来,发展快速且竞争激烈,电商平台也凭借其流量优势强势进入,但却没有出现我国商业中常用的新用户优惠定价策略。在众筹平台不对项目收费假设前提下,以项目发起人的利润最大化和平台方利益最大化为目标,构建了动态双寡头垄断模型。研究证明:在不考虑双平台共同客户情况下,优惠定价最终使两平台平分市场;在考虑共同用户影响下,当两平台初始市场份额差距不大时,平台和发起人均不存在优惠定价的动机,当两平台初始市场份额差距较大时,发起方存在优惠定价的动机。由于共同客户完全弹性,优惠定价会使两平台忠诚客户逐渐变少,最终两寡头会彻底失去产品定价能力。这种理性冲突使得众筹市场不存在新用户优惠定价现象。
Since the crowdfunding has entered the Chinese market as a imported product, it has developed rapidly and is highly competitive. The e-commerce platform has also entered the market by virtue of its traffic advantages. However, there has been no preferential pricing strategy for new subscribers commonly used in commerce in our country. Under the assumption that the crowdfunding platform does not charge for the project, the goal is to maximize the profit of the project sponsor and maximize the benefit of the platform, and construct a dynamic duopoly model. The research proves that under the circumstance that mutual platform does not consider dual-platform clients, preferential pricing will eventually equalize the two platforms. Under the influence of common users, there is no incentive for platform and sponsors to offer preferential pricing when the initial market share gap between the two platforms is small When there is a large gap between the initial market shares of the two platforms, the sponsor has the incentive to preferential pricing. Due to the common customer flexibility, preferential pricing will gradually reduce the number of loyal customers of the two platforms, the final two oligopolies will completely lose the product pricing power. This rational conflict makes crowdfunding market does not exist preferential pricing of new users.