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在中国,目标的设置与评估主要是一个集中化的过程,是贯彻上级政策的一种手段。当绩效评估不可避免地和地位、荣誉、晋升或收入联系在一起时,指标体系的设计实际上成为奖惩体系的设计。目标设置与评估的集中化以及压力体制和干部任期制等的交互作用导致目标实现过程中的荒谬行为和短期行为,并使目标设置与评估失去导向作用。公众参与、政府职能的合理界定、灵活的目标设置与重视公众满意度是绩效目标设置与评估指引价值重建的路径。
In China, the setting and evaluation of goals are mainly a centralized process and a means of implementing higher-level policies. When performance appraisals are inextricably linked to status, honor, promotion, or income, the design of an indicator system actually becomes the design of a rewards and punishments system. The centralization of goal setting and assessment, as well as the interaction of stress system and cadre tenure system, lead to absurd behavior and short-term behavior in the process of goal realization, and make goal setting and evaluation lose direction. Public participation, rational definition of government functions, flexible goal setting and emphasis on public satisfaction are the paths to set performance indicators and evaluate the value rebuilding.