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在科学证言的采信上,法院从有效性的表象或者替代者角度制定了标准,在19世纪和20世纪早期,法院依赖于市场的外行人对专家的行当的普遍接受这一表象。依赖于表象既会使法院犯下假阴性的错误,也会使法院犯下假阳性的错误。在Daubert案中,法院抛弃老旧的Frye普遍接受表象,要求法官要进行认识论探究,以确定所提出的证言是否值得被称为《联邦证据规则》702所规定的“科学……知识”。法院在抛弃表象时,也面临一些挑战,包括保证对方有审查和评判专家推理的公平机会、提高参与者理解科学推理的能力。但是我们对这些挑战应当持乐观的态度。通过抛弃表象,美国最高法院已经迫使我们面对这样的问题,即美国法律制度的参与者是否有能力适当地评估经验数据和推理。对该问题的回答,可能有助于塑造法院未来在追求真相、正义和公共利益方面的角色。
In adopting scientific testimony, courts set standards from the point of view of validity or substitution, and in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries courts relied on the appearance that market lay people were generally accepted as experts. Relying on appearances would both make the court commit a false negative error and would also make the court commit a false positive error. In Daubert, the court abandoned the old Frye’s general acceptance of the claim that judges be required to conduct epistemological inquiry to determine whether the testimony proposed deserves to be referred to as “science ... knowledge” under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 . Courts also face challenges when they abandon appearances, including ensuring that they have a fair chance of reviewing and judging expert reasoning and enhancing participants’ ability to understand scientific reasoning. But we should be optimistic about these challenges. By abandoning the appearance, the Supreme Court of the United States has forced us to face the question of whether the participants in the American legal system are capable of properly assessing empirical data and reasoning. The answer to this question may help to shape the future role of courts in the pursuit of truth, justice and the public interest.