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根据契约理论,企业可以看成是一个契约的集合,其中很重要的一项契约是所有者与经营者的报酬契约。所有权与经营权发生分离,股东要观察经营者的努力程度是不可能的,这是个典型的在合同签订后由于信息不对称而导致的道德风险问题。因为只要可能,理性的经营者就会利用努力程度的不可观察性而选择偷懒。因此,有效的报酬契约应选择与经营者努力程度正相关的指标作为业绩的衡量标准,这种相关性越强,报酬契约的有效性就越强。
According to contract theory, an enterprise can be regarded as a collection of contracts. One of the most important contracts is the contract of compensation between owner and manager. It is impossible for shareholders to observe the efforts of managers if the ownership and management rights are separated. This is a typical moral hazard caused by information asymmetry after the contract is signed. Because whenever possible, rational managers will use the degree of unobservability and choose lazy. Therefore, the effective contract of remuneration should select the index which is positively correlated with the degree of effort of the manager as the performance measure, and the stronger the correlation, the stronger the contract of remuneration.