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当前国有企业改革正处于建立现代企业制度的过程中,主要目标模式是建立有限责任公司、股份有限公司和国有独资公司,以明晰的产权关系激发企业的活力。考察上述三种模式,每一组织结构中都存在着类似股份有限公司中的代理关系,因此,研究企业股份制改造过程中的代理风险防范具有重要的代表意义。在该过程中,旧体制的层级制约束被打破,新的市场约束还没有建立,对代理人(经理人员)的监控出现了空缺,从而引发了大量国有资产流失或低效率运行的普遍现象,若不及时采取适当的手段加以控制和防范,很可能造成新的改革流于形式或旧体制“复归”。
At present, the reform of state-owned enterprises is in the process of establishing a modern enterprise system. The main target mode is to establish limited liability companies, joint stock limited companies, and state-owned sole proprietorship companies to stimulate the vitality of enterprises with clear property rights relations. Examining the above three models, there is an agency relationship similar to that of a joint stock limited company in each organization structure. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the agent risk prevention in the process of reforming the company’s shareholding system. In this process, the old system of hierarchical constraints was broken, new market constraints have not yet been established, and monitoring of agents (managers) has become vacant, leading to a widespread phenomenon of the loss or inefficient operation of large amounts of state-owned assets. Failure to take appropriate measures to control and prevent them in time will likely result in the “return” of new reforms into forms or old systems.