休谟主义和康德主义被认为对我们的实践理性或者理性能动性提供了两种截然不同的乃至不相容的解释:休谟主义被认为不仅得出了一种关于实践理性的怀疑论,而且也对道德原则或道德要求的绝对地位造成威胁,相比较而论,康德主义则被认为维护了实践理性的“自主”地位和道德要求的“绝对”地位。本文旨在表明,一旦我们澄清了休谟主义的两个构成要素——它对行动的理由和动机的说明以及它对工具合理性原则的基础地位的强调——的本质和地位,并给予康德伦理学以一种适度的“自然主义”解释,那么我们就可以有意义地缓解在这两种观点之间被认为存在的张力。本文也试图表明,放弃对实践理性的一种康德式的、基础主义的探讨,转而采纳一种以实践承诺为核心的语境主义探讨,或许是值得向往的。 Humeurism and Kantianism are thought to offer two distinct and sometimes incompatible interpretations of our practical or rational motivation: Humeanism is thought to yield not only a skepticism of practical rationality, but also morality In principle, Kantism is considered to be “” autonomous “position of morality and ” absolute “position of moral requirement. The purpose of this article is to show that once we have clarified the essence and status of two elements of Hume’s doctrine - its account of the rationale and motivation for action and its emphasis on the fundamental position of the principle of instrumental rationality - and given Kant’s ethics Learn to interpret with a modest ”naturalism ", then we can meaningfully ease the tensions that are thought to exist between these two points of view. This article also attempts to show that it may be desirable to abandon a kind of Kantian-based and fundamentalist discussion of practical reason and instead adopt a discussion of contextualism centered on practical commitment.