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委托代理问题存在于非对称信息下的交易关系中,供应链企业间由于信息不对称也存在着委托代理问题。本文从采购商和供应商的视角出发,分析供应链企业间的委托代理问题,并结合新经济条件下该问题的发展状况,提出相应的风险分担和激励机制设计方案。
The principal-agent problem exists in the transaction relationship under asymmetric information. There is also the problem of principal-agent problem because of the asymmetric information among supply chain enterprises. From the perspective of buyers and suppliers, this article analyzes the principal-agent problem among supply chain enterprises, and puts forward the design scheme of risk sharing and incentive mechanism according to the development of this problem in the new economy.