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21世纪以来,秃鹫基金(Vulture funds)利用同权条款(pari passu clauses)进行恶意诉讼,阻碍主权债务重组以谋取利益的现象日益显现,国际社会逐渐就完善主权债务条款、促进有序主权债务重组达成共识。本文以阿根廷主权债务违约为例,论述了债务重组的本质,分析了同权条款的历史沿革及在主权债务重组中的重要影响。阿根廷主权债务违约2001年12月,阿根廷止付其高达1320亿美元的巨额外债,这在当时是一个主权国家有史以来金额最大的违约。为了重返国际主权债务市场,阿根廷政府分别于2005年和2010年推出了两次债务重组,即以旧债面值的25%至35%重新换购新债。为了提高债务重组的参与率,阿根廷政府威胁不履行对不
Since the 21st century, Vulture funds have used the pari passu clauses to carry out malicious litigation, hindering the reorganization of sovereign debt in order to seek benefits. The international community gradually improves the sovereign debt provisions and promotes the orderly restructuring of sovereign debts Reach a consensus This paper takes Argentina’s sovereign debt default as an example, expounds the essence of debt restructuring, analyzes the historical evolution of the same rights clause and its important influence in the sovereign debt restructuring. Argentine sovereign debt default In December 2001, Argentina stopped paying as much as 132 billion U.S. dollars of huge foreign debt, which was at that time the largest default in a sovereign nation’s history. To return to international sovereign debt markets, the Argentine government introduced two debt restructurings in 2005 and 2010, respectively, repurchasing new debt at 25% to 35% of its par value. In order to increase the participation rate of debt restructuring, the Argentine government threatened to not fulfill the right