在亚里士多德首先提出“第一哲学”概念之后,笛卡尔与胡塞尔各有以“第一哲学”为题的著作。他们的“第一哲学”具有各不相同的意蕴,分别代表了第一哲学的三种范式。但是,在关于它们之相互关系的讨论中,胡塞尔的先验现象学被置于比较尴尬的境地:论者往往忽视它的独特性,而将之归并到另外两种范式中,特别是阿佩尔(K-O.Apel)与列维纳斯(E.Levinas)各执一端,可视为典型。阿佩尔认为有三种第一哲学范式,即以亚里士多德代表的存在论范式、以笛卡尔代表的认识论范式和他本人力主的符号学范式。他据此断言,先验现象学在第二种范式的界限内复兴了笛卡尔(Apel,1998a,p.1),至多是“第二种第一哲学范式的最后典范”(Apel,1998b,p.49)。这是将胡塞尔置于以笛卡尔为代表的近代传统的平面上,同时又使其严格区别于以亚里士多德为代表的古代传统。列维纳斯则主张,第一哲学是伦理学,而不是存在论(认识论作为一个变种归属于其下)。他鉴 After Aristotle first proposed the concept of “first philosophy,” Descartes and Husserl each had a book entitled “First Philosophy”. Their “first philosophies” have different meanings and represent the three paradigms of the first philosophy respectively. However, in discussing their interrelationship, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is put in a more embarrassing situation: the one who often neglects its uniqueness and merges it into the other two paradigms, especially KO.Apel and E.Levinas each end, can be regarded as typical. Appel thought there were three first philosophical paradigms, namely, the ontological paradigm represented by Aristotle, the epistemological paradigm represented by Descartes and his own semiotical paradigm. From this he asserted that transcendental phenomenology revived Descartes within the limits of the second paradigm (Apel, 1998a, p. 1), at best “the last paradigm of the second philosophical paradigm” (Apel, 1998b, p.49). This puts Husserl on the plane of modern tradition represented by Descartes while at the same time making it strictly distinguished from the ancient tradition represented by Aristotle. Levinas argued that the first philosophy is ethics, not ontology (epistemology belongs to it as a variant). He Kam