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在高管薪酬水平过高、企业内部薪酬差距过大的背景下,从纵向公平偏好的视角研究了企业内部的委托代理关系和薪酬激励机制,假设员工是具有嫉妒和自豪两种纵向公平偏好的风险规避者,设计了代理人具有纵向公平偏好的委托代理模型。通过模型求解得到如下结论:当总经理的预期净收入高于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而减小;当总经理的预期净收入低于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而增大。
Under the background of the high salary of executives and the large salary gap within the enterprise, this paper studies the internal agency relationship and salary incentive mechanism from the perspective of vertical fairness preference. Suppose the employee is jealous and proud of both vertical and horizontal preferences Risk averse, designed the principal-agent model with vertical and fair preference. Through the model solution, the following conclusions are reached: When the general manager’s expected net income is higher than that of employees, the expected utility decreases with the increase of employees’ vertical fairness preference; when the general manager’s expected net income is lower than that of employees, the expected utility As staff vertical fairness preference intensity increases.