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使用公共部门增量预算编制作为控制变量,来优化公共资产的存量配置,是提高公共部门效率的关键途径。本文使用一个经典的“成本加成合约”机制,研究信息无法观察时公共资产配置预算的编制。当信息可观察但无法证实时,我们引入预算单位的竞争,设计一个子博弈完美执行机制,使提供不诚实预算方案的部门受到惩罚。我们发现公共资产报废率可以作为其使用效率的识别信号,通过设计一个可行的信号甄别机制,对目前广泛实施的“资产配置标准”模式进行改进。针对财政部第35号和第36号令,对公共资产配置预算的规则如何确定才能减少效率损失做出归纳。
The use of public incremental budgeting as a control variable to optimize the stocking of public assets is a key way to increase the efficiency of the public sector. This paper uses a classic “cost-plus contract” mechanism to study the compilation of public asset allocation budgets when information can not be observed. When the information is observable but unverifiable, we introduce competition from the budgetary unit and devise a perfect sub-game enforcement mechanism that penalizes the departments that provide dishonest budget proposals. We find that the public asset retirement rate can be used as an identification signal of the efficiency of its use. By designing a feasible signal screening mechanism, we can improve the currently widely adopted “asset allocation standard” mode. For the Ministry of Finance No. 35 and 36, the public asset allocation budget rules how to determine the reduction of efficiency losses can be summarized.