可行能力思路认为,罗尔斯式的社会契约论假定公民的能力处于正常范围,从而把具有严重能力缺陷的人排除在正义原则的选择者与受益者之外了。它们将此归咎为这种契约论对互惠互利的预先承诺。事实上,在罗尔斯后期的契约论构造当中,互惠互利既不是主导性的预设,也不是其主导性预设的一个构成部分。相反,由理性与合情理性一起共同塑造的相互性理念构成了这种正义理论由以确立的规范性前提。否定互惠互利的理念,不仅有利于我们准确理解罗尔斯的契约论,而且对于我们反思契约论传统是否仍然具备足够的包容性潜力去应对现代社会正义问题,都将提供一个新的解释视角。 Feasible ability thinking that the Socialist Contract Theory of Rawlsian assumption that the ability of citizens in the normal range, so that those with serious defects in ability to exclude those who choose the beneficiaries of justice and beneficiaries. They attribute this to their pre-commitment to reciprocity and mutual benefit. In fact, in the structure of contractualism in Rawls’s later period, the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit is neither the predominant presupposition nor an integral part of its dominant presupposition. On the contrary, the concept of mutuality jointly shaped by rationality and rationality constitutes the normative premise that this theory of justice establishes. Negating the concept of reciprocity and mutual benefit not only helps us to understand Rawls’ contract theory accurately, but also provides a new perspective for explaining whether the tradition of contractual contract theory still has enough inclusive potential to deal with the problem of modern social justice.