论文部分内容阅读
On November 24， a Russian Su-24 fighter jet was flying at an altitude of 6，000 meters when it was hit by an air-to-air missile. The plane then crashed into a mountainous area of a Syrian province near the Turkish border.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the Su-24 was over Syrian territory when it was hit， while Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that the plane was fired at while in Turkish national airspace， after it had been warned 10 times in the space of five minutes.
The incident has since marked the beginning of a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Russia—their first military clash in more than a century.
Deal breaker？
Turkey and Russia have had major political divergences over Syria lurking in the shadows. It was a status quo that was maintained as long as they were fighting each other through proxies while still doing business with each other. However， that situation seems no longer sustainable after the fighter jet was shot down.
Moscow sees Ankara as not only aiding and abetting the rebel groups that are fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad， but also exchanging weapons for gasoline with the radical Islamist group called ISIS， based on reports by Russian media. Meanwhile， Ankara sees Moscow as a disruptive figure partly responsible for the plight of the Syrian people.
The issue has been exacerbated through the media， and outright threats have been exchanged. Russian reports have claimed that Ankara is taking advantage of radical Islamist groups in Syria regardless of the moral and geopolitical consequences.
The blame game is also putting more recent bilateral cooperation at risk. In 2003， the Blue Stream undersea gas pipeline was built， forging a direct source of fuel for Turkey from Russia， signaling strengthening economic relations. By 2014 Russia had become the top exporter to Turkey. Tourism also emerged as a major link between the two countries， with Russia sending the largest number of tourists to Turkey last year. There are also plans for a construction of the first nuclear plant in Turkey by the Russians. Located at Akkuyu， the project is worth $20 billion and the deal was well underway， just like the negotiations for a new gas pipeline， designed to bypass Ukraine for Russian gas exports to Europe.
All of those projects have since been canceled， first as punishing measures taken by Putin， following the downing of the Su-24. So， why did Turkey run the risk of losing those gains？ A tense history
There is no simple answer to that question. However， one may find clues through a study of history.
Actually， tensions have been a hallmark of Russo-Turkish relations throughout history. Since the war of 1768-74， relations between the two nations have been rocky. Turkey was incensed once more during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea， as the move could potentially pose a threat to Turkey’s role as a major Black Sea power. Similarly， after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s， Ankara supported Chechen separatists， and Moscow reacted by encouraging the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. After World War II， Turkey joined the Western-led NATO in 1952 as a reaction to Joseph Stalin， the then leader of the Soviet Union who had claimed control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits.
Geopolitical implications
In September， Russia carried out the first air strikes in Syria， saying its target was ISIS. However， the West and the Syrian opposition claim it mainly targets anti-Assad rebels instead.
Following the downing of a Russian passenger airliner in Egypt in October， which ISIS extremists claimed responsibility for， Putin decided to retaliate against ISIS and other Islamic terrorists in Syria by increasing airstrikes. But the forceful Russian intervention did not please everybody， mostly those who have supported the opposition forces and their guerrilla tactics for the past four years， namely Turkey， Saudi Arabia， and Qatar. This support was given the blessings of the West， which occasionally turned a blind eye. As for the Arab-Western alliance， the Russian air strikes were directed against Turkmen positions， not against ISIS. This demonstrates that Moscow is still intent on bolstering Syrian President al-Assad against some of other opponents， regardless of what may be happening on the counter-extremist front.
The Russian intervention threatened to completely change the power balance in favor of al-Assad. Whatever the support they got from their allies， those who were fighting the Baathist regime in Damascus， all targets included—ISIS， Jabhat al Nusra， Ahrar al-Sham， Muslim Brotherhood， etc.—regard-less of the differences， are no match against Russian firepower.
When Russian warplanes started pounding the Turkish mountain to the north of Latakia， it was on the assumption that the weapons sent to the rebel groups by the CIA via Turkey took that road near the Turkish border. Latakia is a very important province for Russia， and neither the Kremlin nor Damascus wants it to fall into rebel hands. Beyond the fact that Latakia has a crucial port of the same name， is heavily Alawite （the Shiite group that has ruled Syria since 1963）， and could be a safe shore for al-Assad， it is also home to the Tartus naval base leased to the Russians. If Latakia is lost， all the Russian strategic objectives attached to the area go down， too. The Russian Navy has been using the Tartus naval base for a long time， a base which is the only military port available to Russia outside of the former Soviet Union.
Putin’s answer
In spite of Turkey’s opposition toward proAssad action， Russian airstrikes along the Syrian-Turkish border continued.
Even further—if Ankara and its allies were trying to impose a no-fly zone， Putin’s answer consisted of deploying the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in Syria. Thus， it is not enough for Putin that the continual Russian airstrikes have already changed the deal. He needs more attacks to make the Russian positions entrenched. Even before the downing of the Russian military jet， observers did not exclude the hypothesis that Moscow was manning Syria’s air defense systems. Today， with the introduction of the S-400 air defense system， it becomes clear that Putin intends to block any direct Western action such as an enforcement of a no-fly zone or the launch of punitive air strikes against Assad. The presence of Russian missiles and personnel would make such a campaign very risky， as the casualties resulting from those actions would have unpredictable geopolitical consequences.
It is not surprising that both the U.S. and Turkish air forces halted their strikes on Syrian territory around the time Russia deployed the air defense system at the Khmeimim airbase， from which Moscow stages its own incursions against ISIS and other radical groups.
Moscow will not relinquish its grip on Syria’s Assad.
So far， just like the anti-Assad forces and their Western and Arab allies， Russia does not have any guarantee about what an eventual post-Assad era would look like.
If Moscow allows anti-Assad forces to take control of Syria， it loses a major asset. Having a pro-Russian ally in Syria may be of value for Putin in that it blocks Qatar， Turkey and Saudi Arabia from increased energy domination in the region. Any new postAssad regime， which is not controlled by Moscow， may allow cheap Qatari gas to flow via Syria to the Mediterranean， thus undermining Russia’s dominance of the European gas market through Gazprom.
Furthermore， radical Islamism is a source of civil conflict and terrorism for Moscow. That made Russia wary of growing Islamist trends in Turkey. The prospect of an alliance between Turkey’s Islamic groups and those of an eventual post-Assad Syria is worrisome because of its closeness to Russia’s borders. Thus， as far as Putin is concerned， protecting Assad’s control of Syria protects Russian national security.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the Su-24 was over Syrian territory when it was hit， while Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that the plane was fired at while in Turkish national airspace， after it had been warned 10 times in the space of five minutes.
The incident has since marked the beginning of a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Russia—their first military clash in more than a century.
Deal breaker？
Turkey and Russia have had major political divergences over Syria lurking in the shadows. It was a status quo that was maintained as long as they were fighting each other through proxies while still doing business with each other. However， that situation seems no longer sustainable after the fighter jet was shot down.
Moscow sees Ankara as not only aiding and abetting the rebel groups that are fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad， but also exchanging weapons for gasoline with the radical Islamist group called ISIS， based on reports by Russian media. Meanwhile， Ankara sees Moscow as a disruptive figure partly responsible for the plight of the Syrian people.
The issue has been exacerbated through the media， and outright threats have been exchanged. Russian reports have claimed that Ankara is taking advantage of radical Islamist groups in Syria regardless of the moral and geopolitical consequences.
The blame game is also putting more recent bilateral cooperation at risk. In 2003， the Blue Stream undersea gas pipeline was built， forging a direct source of fuel for Turkey from Russia， signaling strengthening economic relations. By 2014 Russia had become the top exporter to Turkey. Tourism also emerged as a major link between the two countries， with Russia sending the largest number of tourists to Turkey last year. There are also plans for a construction of the first nuclear plant in Turkey by the Russians. Located at Akkuyu， the project is worth $20 billion and the deal was well underway， just like the negotiations for a new gas pipeline， designed to bypass Ukraine for Russian gas exports to Europe.
All of those projects have since been canceled， first as punishing measures taken by Putin， following the downing of the Su-24. So， why did Turkey run the risk of losing those gains？ A tense history
There is no simple answer to that question. However， one may find clues through a study of history.
Actually， tensions have been a hallmark of Russo-Turkish relations throughout history. Since the war of 1768-74， relations between the two nations have been rocky. Turkey was incensed once more during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea， as the move could potentially pose a threat to Turkey’s role as a major Black Sea power. Similarly， after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s， Ankara supported Chechen separatists， and Moscow reacted by encouraging the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. After World War II， Turkey joined the Western-led NATO in 1952 as a reaction to Joseph Stalin， the then leader of the Soviet Union who had claimed control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits.
Geopolitical implications
In September， Russia carried out the first air strikes in Syria， saying its target was ISIS. However， the West and the Syrian opposition claim it mainly targets anti-Assad rebels instead.
Following the downing of a Russian passenger airliner in Egypt in October， which ISIS extremists claimed responsibility for， Putin decided to retaliate against ISIS and other Islamic terrorists in Syria by increasing airstrikes. But the forceful Russian intervention did not please everybody， mostly those who have supported the opposition forces and their guerrilla tactics for the past four years， namely Turkey， Saudi Arabia， and Qatar. This support was given the blessings of the West， which occasionally turned a blind eye. As for the Arab-Western alliance， the Russian air strikes were directed against Turkmen positions， not against ISIS. This demonstrates that Moscow is still intent on bolstering Syrian President al-Assad against some of other opponents， regardless of what may be happening on the counter-extremist front.
The Russian intervention threatened to completely change the power balance in favor of al-Assad. Whatever the support they got from their allies， those who were fighting the Baathist regime in Damascus， all targets included—ISIS， Jabhat al Nusra， Ahrar al-Sham， Muslim Brotherhood， etc.—regard-less of the differences， are no match against Russian firepower.
When Russian warplanes started pounding the Turkish mountain to the north of Latakia， it was on the assumption that the weapons sent to the rebel groups by the CIA via Turkey took that road near the Turkish border. Latakia is a very important province for Russia， and neither the Kremlin nor Damascus wants it to fall into rebel hands. Beyond the fact that Latakia has a crucial port of the same name， is heavily Alawite （the Shiite group that has ruled Syria since 1963）， and could be a safe shore for al-Assad， it is also home to the Tartus naval base leased to the Russians. If Latakia is lost， all the Russian strategic objectives attached to the area go down， too. The Russian Navy has been using the Tartus naval base for a long time， a base which is the only military port available to Russia outside of the former Soviet Union.
Putin’s answer
In spite of Turkey’s opposition toward proAssad action， Russian airstrikes along the Syrian-Turkish border continued.
Even further—if Ankara and its allies were trying to impose a no-fly zone， Putin’s answer consisted of deploying the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in Syria. Thus， it is not enough for Putin that the continual Russian airstrikes have already changed the deal. He needs more attacks to make the Russian positions entrenched. Even before the downing of the Russian military jet， observers did not exclude the hypothesis that Moscow was manning Syria’s air defense systems. Today， with the introduction of the S-400 air defense system， it becomes clear that Putin intends to block any direct Western action such as an enforcement of a no-fly zone or the launch of punitive air strikes against Assad. The presence of Russian missiles and personnel would make such a campaign very risky， as the casualties resulting from those actions would have unpredictable geopolitical consequences.
It is not surprising that both the U.S. and Turkish air forces halted their strikes on Syrian territory around the time Russia deployed the air defense system at the Khmeimim airbase， from which Moscow stages its own incursions against ISIS and other radical groups.
Moscow will not relinquish its grip on Syria’s Assad.
So far， just like the anti-Assad forces and their Western and Arab allies， Russia does not have any guarantee about what an eventual post-Assad era would look like.
If Moscow allows anti-Assad forces to take control of Syria， it loses a major asset. Having a pro-Russian ally in Syria may be of value for Putin in that it blocks Qatar， Turkey and Saudi Arabia from increased energy domination in the region. Any new postAssad regime， which is not controlled by Moscow， may allow cheap Qatari gas to flow via Syria to the Mediterranean， thus undermining Russia’s dominance of the European gas market through Gazprom.
Furthermore， radical Islamism is a source of civil conflict and terrorism for Moscow. That made Russia wary of growing Islamist trends in Turkey. The prospect of an alliance between Turkey’s Islamic groups and those of an eventual post-Assad Syria is worrisome because of its closeness to Russia’s borders. Thus， as far as Putin is concerned， protecting Assad’s control of Syria protects Russian national security.