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本文通过在纵向关联市场框架下构建一个博弈模型,研究两个下游国在分别采取独立贸易报复与联合进行贸易报复两种情况下,中国政府应采取的稀土出口政策。研究发现:(1)当下游国家独立采取贸易报复措施时,若中国稀土产业集中度低(高),则应对稀土出口进行征税(补贴),而下游国会对最终产品出口进行补贴(征税)。(2)当下游国联合进行贸易报复时,在中国稀土产业集中度很低且下游国产业集中度很高的情况下,中国应对稀土出口进行征税,而下游国总会选择对最终产品出口进行征税。(3)若考虑到稀土生产带来的环境污染,则随着环境污染系数增加,无论下游国家采取何种方式的贸易报复措施,中国对稀土出口都将会进行更多的限制。
In this paper, we construct a game model under the framework of vertical correlation market to study the policy of rare earths export which Chinese government should take in two downstream countries, which take independent trade retaliation and joint trade retaliation respectively. The findings are as follows: (1) When the downstream countries take trade retaliation independently, the export of rare earths should be taxed (subsidized) if the concentration of rare earth industry in China is low (high), while the downstream congress will subsidize the export of final products ). (2) When the downstream countries conduct trade retaliation jointly, China should levy taxes on the export of rare earths while the concentration of rare earth industry in China is very low and the concentration of downstream industries is very high. However, the downstream country will choose to export its final products Taxation. (3) Considering the environmental pollution caused by rare earth production, with the increase of environmental pollution coefficient, no matter what kind of trade retaliatory measures downstream countries take, China will have more restrictions on the export of rare earths.