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基于演化博弈理论,分析了村庄公共品供给过程中,农民创业者之间、农民创业者与政府之间的演化博弈关系,探讨了村庄公共品供给内生机制形成的可行性和普适性。分析表明:部分农民创业者供给村庄公共品的行为会对其他农民创业者产生积极带动作用;政府的鼓励和支持是提高农民创业者供给概率的重要手段;当地村民、村委等利益相关者的舆论支持是影响博弈主体成本、收益,改变博弈结果的重要因素。研究认为以农民创业者为核心形成村庄公共品供给内生机制是可行的,该结论对中国广地农村地区治理村庄凋敝、建设美丽乡村具有良好的借鉴意义。
Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game relationship between farmer entrepreneurs, farmer entrepreneurs and the government during the supply of village public goods, and discusses the feasibility and universality of the endogenous mechanism of village public goods supply. The analysis shows that: some peasant entrepreneurs provide village public goods behavior will have an active role in promoting other peasant entrepreneurs; the government encouragement and support is to improve the peasant entrepreneurs provide an important means of probability; local villagers, village committees and other stakeholders Public opinion support is an important factor that affects the main cost of the game, benefits and changes in the outcome of the game. The conclusion is that it is feasible to form endogenous mechanism of village public goods supply with peasant entrepreneurs as the core. This conclusion has a good reference for governance village in rural areas of Canton China and the construction of beautiful villages.