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本文以1998-2004年间股权转让终止的公司为样本,以当年控制权转移成功的公司为配对样本,采用均值比较和Logistic回归的方法,研究股权转让终止公司的特征及管理者激励对管理层行为的影响。结果表明,股权协议转让终止的公司和控制权转移成功的公司相比,具有较低的管理层持股和较强的控制权激励。Logistic回归结果显示,控制权激励越大管理层抵抗的可能性就越大。建议增加管理层持股,尽快建立管理层控制权收益损失补偿机制,减少管理层对收购的抵抗。
Based on the sample of companies terminated by equity transfer from 1998 to 2004 and the successful transfer of control right in the year as the paired samples, the paper uses the means of average comparison and Logistic regression to study the characteristics of termination of share transfer and the influence of manager incentive on management behavior Impact. The results show that companies with terminated equity transfer agreements have lower management shareholdings and stronger control incentives than those with successful transfer of control rights. Logistic regression results show that the greater the incentive to control the greater the possibility of management resistance. It is suggested to increase the shareholding of the management and establish compensation mechanism for loss of control gains of management as soon as possible so as to reduce the management’s resistance to the acquisition.