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以2001年至2007年A股上市公司为样本,从我国特有的制度背景出发探讨了政府干预对公司多元化经营行为及其经济后果的影响。实证结果表明,由于政府对政治目标的考虑及管理者对权力的追求,使得政府干预程度较高的上市公司更倾向于实行多元化经营。此外,与政府干预程度较低的上市公司相比,在政府干预程度较高的上市公司中实施多元化经营会导致更为严重的多元化折价问题。
Taking the A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2007 as a sample, this paper explores the influence of government intervention on the diversification behavior and economic consequences of the company from the perspective of its unique institutional background. The empirical results show that due to the government’s consideration of political goals and managers’ pursuit of power, the listed companies with a high degree of government intervention tend to practice diversification. In addition, the diversification of listed companies with higher levels of government intervention leads to a more serious issue of diversified discount than listed companies with less government intervention.