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本文认为,从产业组织角度来看,食品安全问题是一个企业行为和市场绩效问题。本文区别于从消费者支付意愿和政府规制的角度,而是从食品生产的纵向过程入手,基于投资激励和谈判理论,研究了一体化所有权结构和分散所有权结构下的厂商卫生投资行为。文章认为,由于食品生产环节之间的所有权关系不同,厂商在控制各生产环节的病菌扩散过程中的努力程度也不同,投资激励的不一致性造成食品的安全性存在很大的不确定性,所以纵向一体化更有助于食品安全性的提高。发展多种形式的适度规模经营,对于食品生产企业来说扩大企业经营的空间,可能从根本上解决我国食品生产过程中激励不一致所造成的食品安全问题。
This paper argues that from the industrial organization point of view, food safety is a problem of corporate behavior and market performance. This article is different from the willingness of consumers to pay and the regulation of government, but starts from the longitudinal process of food production. Based on the theory of investment incentives and negotiation, this paper studies the firm’s health investment behavior under the structure of integrated ownership and decentralized ownership structure. The article argues that due to the different ownership relations between the food production processes, the efforts of manufacturers in controlling the spread of germs in various production processes are also different, and the inconsistency of investment incentives has caused great uncertainty in the safety of food. Therefore, Vertical integration is more conducive to the improvement of food safety. The development of various forms of moderate scale operations, for food production enterprises to expand the space for business management, may fundamentally solve the food production in China caused by inconsistent incentives for food safety issues.