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有效的“产学研”合作技术创新模式是有力提升企业技术能力与创新能力的核心途径之一;同时也是高校提升自身科研成果转化率的关键。从创新的类型、主体以及创新过程中资源与能力优化配置的角度出发,归纳出两种典型“产学研”合作技术创新模式:以高校为主导兴建的企业模式以及以企业为主导的集成创新模式,并着重对后一种创新模式进行了分析。在此模式下,鉴于控制权与合作关系是影响创新效应的两个核心变量;将高校-企业合作关系分成两类:长期合作关系与短期合作关系,将控制权类型分为两种类型:集中控制与分散控制。在此基础上,着眼于“产学研”合作创新过程:企业从契约提供、合作创新过程的有效组织及产业竞争的系统维度,以动态博弈与委托-代理等理论为工具,建立了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,分别得出了短期合作关系下集中控制、短期合作关系下分散控制、长期合作关系下集中控制、长期合作关系下分散控制四种不同情形的子博弈完美纳什均衡解,并对每种情形及其博弈结果进行了细化分析。最后,从双边关系的类型、控制权类型以及委托-代理效应三个不同维度,从静态与动态两个方面比较分析了创新的知识投入、工资、产量、价格、利润等均衡变量的差异性。
Effective “industry-university-research ” cooperative technological innovation model is one of the core ways to effectively enhance the technological capabilities and innovation capabilities of enterprises; at the same time, it is also the key to enhance the conversion rate of scientific research achievements. From the perspective of innovation type, main body and optimal allocation of resources and capabilities in the process of innovation, this paper induces two typical models of “technological innovation”: the enterprise model led by colleges and universities and the enterprise-led integration Innovative model, and focused on the latter model of innovation were analyzed. In this model, given that control rights and cooperative relations are the two core variables that affect the innovation effect, the university-enterprise cooperation is divided into two types: long-term cooperation and short-term cooperation. The types of control are classified into two types: concentration Control and decentralized control. On this basis, we focus on the cooperative innovation process of “industry-university-institute”: from the system of contract supply, the effective organization of cooperative innovation process and the industrial competition, the paper sets up a theory of dynamic game and commission- Three-stage dynamic game model, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solutions of four different situations under centralized control in short-term cooperation, decentralized control in short-term cooperation, centralized control in long-term cooperation and distributed control in long-term cooperation Detailed analysis of each situation and its game results. Finally, this paper analyzes the differences of the equilibrium variables of innovation, such as knowledge input, salary, output, price and profit from the static and dynamic aspects from three different dimensions of the type of bilateral relations, the type of control and the principal-agent effect.