论文部分内容阅读
2004年5月,欧盟指责中国的焦炭出口配额制度违反了世界贸易组织的规则,并要求中国政府取消该配额制度,否则将在世贸组织起诉中国。经过紧密磋商,中国做出让步,同意保证对欧盟的焦炭供应。本文通过详尽的法律分析指出,欧盟的理由并不充分;中国完全可以援引关贸总协定中的一些条款,比如第11条和20条,来为自己的配额制度辩护。而从政治经济学的角度来看,中国之所以急于让步,是出于其对于运用世贸组织争端解决机制的排斥心理。实际上,如果运用得当,世贸组织争端解决机制完全可以被用作维护中国合法利益的有力工具。本文的结论是,中国应该积极学习世贸组织的规则,充分利用有关规则最大限度地保护自己的合法权益。
In May 2004, the EU accused China of export quota system of coke in violation of World Trade Organization rules and demanded that the Chinese government cancel the quota system or else it will prosecute China in the WTO. After close consultations, China made concessions and agreed to guarantee coke supply to the EU. This article, through exhaustive legal analysis, points out that there are not enough reasons for the EU; China can quite cite some of the provisions of the GATT, such as Articles 11 and 20, to justify its quota system. From a political economy point of view, China is eager to give in because of its exclusionary mentality over the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In fact, if properly used, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can well be used as a powerful tool for safeguarding the legitimate interests of China. The conclusion of this paper is that China should actively study WTO rules and make full use of the relevant rules to protect its own legitimate rights and interests to the maximum extent.