论文部分内容阅读
针对单制造商和两零售商组成的供应链,假定产品存在次品需返修、产品需求为随机的且受到产品质量和零售商促销努力的影响,运用均衡分析方法建立了零售商为风险中性时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,给出了协调供应链的回购加促销补贴合同。然后基于条件风险值准则建立了零售商为风险厌恶时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,给出了协调该供应链的回购加促销补贴合同。最后的算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明:零售商越厌恶风险,其订货量越少,制造商、零售商和供应链的收益都将下降;而产品正品率的提高有利于供应链各方;零售商为风险中性时的供应链决策是零售商为风险厌恶者的特例。
For a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and two retailers, it is assumed that there is a defective product to be repaired, product demand is random and affected by product quality and retailer promotional efforts, and a balanced analysis is used to establish the retailer’s risk-neutral When the supply chain centralized decision-making model and decentralized decision-making model, given the coordination of the supply chain repurchase plus promotional subsidies contract. Then, based on the condition risk value criterion, the centralized decision-making model and decentralized decision-making model of retailers in risk aversion are established, and the repurchase plus promotion subsidy contract is given. The last example shows the rationality of the model and the validity of the coordination contract. Research shows that retailers are more risk-averse, and the fewer their orders, the profits of manufacturers, retailers and supply chains will all decrease. The improvement of the genuine product yield will benefit all parties in the supply chain. When retailers are risk-neutral Supply chain decision making is a special case of retailers as risk averse.