塞尔在《意向性》中提出关于意向性的生物主义解释。这个解释利用他的言语行为理论所提供的函项框架,同时引入意向性的因果关系来描述意向对象的呈现方式。在他看来,意向性是生物机体的一种高阶逻辑性质,通过生物学性质实现,但不能还原成生物学性质。但是,这种生物主义观点很难说有意义。即使不考虑这一点,建立在上述基础上的意向内容理论也不具备应对怀疑论的能力。 In his “Intentionality,” Selsell proposed a biotic explanation of intentionality. This explanation uses the functional framework provided by his speech act theory and at the same time introduces intentional causation to describe the presentation of the intention object. In his view, intentionality is a high-order logical nature of the living organism, achieved through biological properties, but can not be reduced to biological properties. However, this biographical point of view is hard to say meaningful. Even if this is not taken into account, the content theory based on the above does not have the ability to deal with skepticism.