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戴维森反对“概念相对论”的主要立论落脚于语言的可译性和互译性上,但是,在他的论述中,他所围绕的中心却是语言的可释性和互释性。在他看来,由于从原则上讲,没有不可释的语言,所以也就不存在所谓的“概念构架”。本文旨在从翻译与解释的差别以及翻译的适应性的角度对戴维森的这种可释性策略进行质疑,并对戴维森所提出的主要论证逐一进行了考察。我的主要观点是:语言的可释性并不直接支持语言的可译性,而对于“概念相对论”构成威胁的是后者而不是前者。
Davidson’s opposition to “the theory of relativity” mainly focuses on the translatability and translatability of language, but in his discourse he centers on the releasability and interdependence of language. In his opinion, there is no so-called “conceptual framework” because, in principle, there is no indefinable language. The purpose of this article is to question Davidson’s strategy of releasability from the perspective of the differences between translation and interpretation and the adaptability of translation. One by one, Davidson’s major arguments are examined. My main point is that the releasability of language does not directly support the translatability of language, but the latter, rather than the former, poses a threat to “conceptual relativity.”