本文试图探讨两个问题:第一,降低电价是否是推动电力体制改革的合理动机;第二,电力体制改革是否能够降低电价。理论分析表明,传统电力体制的核心弊端是效率低、成本高,而高成本必然分摊到终端销售电价上。以引入竞争为核心的电力体制改革旨在通过市场竞争提高效率、降低成本,进而降低电价。但是,在电力市场体制下,衡量价格与成本偏差的勒纳指数可能会扩大,这会使得生产成本的降低无法充分传导到电价降低上,而是增加企业利润。这一点在英国体制改革中已经得到验证。在我国,电力行业的生产效率还有较大提高空间,因此,各地方政府希望通过改革降低成本,从而降低工业电价。但是,考虑到政府管制下我国电力行业的资产利润率长期偏低的事实,改革后成本的节约必然会体现在某些企业利润增加上,而不是降低电价。甚至可能由于市场设计不当导致勒纳指数大幅度提高,则电价不降反升。 This article attempts to explore two issues: First, whether to reduce the price of electricity is a reasonable motive to promote the reform of the power system; second, whether the reform of the electricity system can reduce the price of electricity. Theoretical analysis shows that the core disadvantages of the traditional power system are low efficiency and high costs, and high costs must be allocated to the terminal sales price. The introduction of competition as the core of the power system reform aims to improve efficiency and reduce costs through market competition, thereby reducing electricity prices. However, under the electricity market system, the Lerner Index, which measures the deviation between price and cost, may expand, which can make the reduction of production costs unable to fully transmit to the reduction of electricity prices, but increase the profits of the company. This point has been verified in the UK’s institutional reforms. In China, there is still room for improvement in the production efficiency of the power industry. Therefore, local governments hope to reduce costs through reforms, thereby reducing industrial electricity prices. However, taking into account the fact that the government’s control of China’s power industry under the long-term low asset profit rate, the cost savings after the reform will inevitably be reflected in the increase in the profits of some companies, rather than reducing electricity prices. It may even be due to the improper design of the market that led to a significant increase in the Lerner Index.