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以融资约束差异和代理成本理论为基础,基于我国特殊的制度背景,将宏观层面的金融市场化进程和微观层面的公司管理者权力结合来研究上市公司的投资效率。研究发现:管理者权力并没有使投资效率得到改善,金融市场化程度的提高也没有使管理者权力与投资效率关系得到显著改善,投资效率低下反而还有继续扩大的趋势。研究成果为解读我国上市公司“高投资—低效率”现象、丰富财务理论和公司治理理论提供了新的经验证据。
Based on the special institutional background of China, this paper studies the investment efficiency of listed companies by combining the process of financial marketization at macro level with the power of managers at the micro level based on the theory of financing constraints and agency cost. The study found that: the power of managers did not improve the investment efficiency, and the improvement of the degree of financial marketization did not significantly improve the relationship between managers’ power and investment efficiency. On the contrary, investment inefficiency continued to expand. The research results provide new empirical evidence for the interpretation of the phenomenon of “high investment - inefficiency”, enrichment of financial theory and corporate governance theory of listed companies in our country.