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《哲学通论》确实实现了一次本体论的革命。在这里,所谓的本体既不是指世界的“本原”问题,又不仅仅是指人的思维的形上追求或“至上性”原则,而是指隐匿于思想知识中的思想知识得以可能的根据和标准。对于这种作为规范人的思想乃至行为的本体的探讨,只能诉诸对思想知识的前提批判,这就是哲学意义上的反思。但问题是,在拒斥了绝对主义的实体本体论之后,或者说,思想的根据一旦不再是“绝对之绝对”之后,一切的本体论追求,因为都是基于人类的实践活动的产物而都带上了历史性的相对性质。如何规避这样一种对本体论的历史性理解的相对主义困境,可能是一个必须面对的理论话题。
The General Theory of Philosophy did realize an ontological revolution. Here, the so-called ontology refers neither to the “primitive” issue of the world, nor to the human’s pursuit of the metaphysical or “supreme” principle, but to the idea concealed in the ideological knowledge Knowledge is based on possible criteria. The discussion of this noumenon as the norm of human thought and even of conduct can only resort to criticizing the premise of the ideological knowledge, which is a philosophical reflection. But the question is, after rejecting the absolutist ontology, or after the foundation of thought is no longer “absolutely absolute”, all ontological pursuits, because they are all based on the practice of mankind Products have brought a historic relative nature. How to circumvent the relativistic dilemma of such a historical understanding of the ontology may be a theoretical topic that must be faced.