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如何设计合理的金融契约以增强对创业企业家和风险投资者双方的激励是公司金融研究领域的一个重要话题。运用实验室经济学方法,并结合创业企业阶段融资的现实特点,构建了标准债务契约、简单可转债契约以及可赎回可转债契约三种实验环境,分析了上述三种金融契约对企业家和投资者激励效应的差异。实验结果表明,对于企业家而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的努力水平最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。对于投资者而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的初始资金比例最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。进一步地分析还发现,在控制了外部环境的影响时,可赎回可转债契约下,项目得到继续投资的概率最高,企业家和投资者双方的收益最高,社会福利最大。
How to design a reasonable financial contract to enhance the incentives for entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is an important topic in corporate finance research. By using the method of laboratory economics and combining with the realistic characteristics of venture capital stage financing, this paper constructs three kinds of experimental environments of standard debt contract, simple convertible bond contract and redeemable convertible bond contract, analyzes the above three kinds of financial contract to enterprise Differences in incentive effects between home and investor. The experimental results show that for entrepreneurs, the highest level of effort under the redeemable convertible bond contract is the lowest under the simple convertible bond contract and the middle under the standard debt compact. For investors, the initial capital invested under the redeemable convertible bond contract is the highest, with the lowest under the simple convertible bond contract and the middle under the standard debt contract. Further analysis also found that under the control of the impact of the external environment, under the contract of redeemable convertible bonds, the probability of the project getting the continued investment is the highest, and the income of both the entrepreneur and the investor is the highest, and the social welfare is the largest.