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从我国煤炭资源整合中“国进民退”的产权契约设置现状出发,借鉴Schmidt、Shleifer和Vishny的研究思路,以不完全契约理论和控制权理论为基础,构建我国煤炭资源整合过程中基于政府规制和内部人控制双重视角的产权配置契约模型。发现对煤炭行业保持着较高规制程度的政府以自身效用最大化决定产权契约边界设置。政府和国有企业内部控制人专有性关系越强,内部控制人越倾向于积极扩张国有企业规模,其对政府的“绑架效应”越强,进而降低政府的政治效益和增加代理成本。因此政府宏观经济规制要以必要程度为限,减少对内部控制人专有性投资的过度依赖。
Based on the status quo of setting up the property rights contract in the integration of coal resources in our country and from the state-owned assets retirement, we draw lessons from the research ideas of Schmidt, Shleifer and Vishny, based on incomplete contract theory and control theory, Property Allocation Contract Model Based on Dual Perspectives of Government Regulation and Internal Control. Found that the coal industry to maintain a high degree of regulation of the government to maximize their own effectiveness to determine the boundaries of property rights contract set. The stronger the exclusive relationship between the government and the SOE’s internal controller, the more inclined the internal controller is to actively expand the SOE’s size. The stronger its “kidnapping effect” on the government, the lower the government’s political efficiency and the agency cost. Therefore, the government macroeconomic regulation should be limited to the extent necessary to reduce over-reliance on the exclusive investment of the internal controller.