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本文考察了我国民营上市公司高声誉独立董事是否抑制了企业盈余管理行为。基于2007-2015年我国民营上市公司样本,研究发现聘请高声誉会计独立董事的上市公司其操纵性应计盈余及真实活动盈余显著更低,说明高声誉的会计独立董事抑制了企业的盈余管理行为。进一步分析发现,公司所在地市场化程度越强,独立董事声誉对企业盈余管理的抑制作用越弱。这表明伴随市场化程度的增强,降低了对声誉等非正式契约的依赖,即市场化进程与独立董事声誉之间存在着相互替代的关系。
This article examines whether high-reputation, independent directors of private listed companies in China suppress corporate earnings management. Based on the sample of private listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015, the study found that listed companies employing highly-acclaimed accounting independent directors have significantly lower maneuvering accruals and real activity surpluses, indicating that highly-acclaimed independent accounting directors inhibit the earnings management behavior of enterprises . Further analysis found that the stronger the marketization of the company, the weakened the inhibition of independent directors’ reputation on corporate earnings management. This shows that with the enhancement of marketization, the dependence on informal contracts such as reputation is reduced, that is, there is a reciprocal relationship between the marketization process and the reputation of independent directors.