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根据混合策略纳什均衡的一般概念,本文构建了社会保险待遇发放中监管者和待遇领取者之间的混合策略博弈模型,并求出监管者和待遇领取者之间博弈时各自的最优选择。在社会保险基金监管立法中针对待遇领取者的违法行为,应增强法律的威慑力,降低违法的诱惑力。针对监管者应以低成本的非现场监督为主。根据博弈分析的结果,可以在未来制定的相关法律、法规中提出相应的监管立法建议。
According to the general concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, this paper constructs a mixed strategy game model between supervisors and treatment recipients in the payment of social insurance benefits, and determines the optimal choice of each game between supervisors and the recipients of treatment. In the supervision of the social insurance fund for the treatment of those who receive the violations, we should enhance the deterrent force of law to reduce the temptation of illegal. Regulators should focus on low-cost off-site supervision. According to the results of the game analysis, we can put forward corresponding regulatory legislative proposals in the relevant laws and regulations formulated in the future.