在各国预算体系中,“省”这一最高层级的地方预算单位承上启下,连结中央政府和省以下地方预算级次,对地方经济与社会发展具有显著的引导、促进和保障作用。如果政府间税收竞争超过合理限度,就有可能影响资源配置效率、破坏利益分配公平,法律规制税收竞争的必要性不言而喻,而法律规制路径的设计则是一个世界性难题,亟需理论研究支持。就我国而言,省级预算单位交错充当四重截然不同的法律角色:既包括省以下税收分成规则的制定者、县级基本财力保障政策的执行者、省内税收竞争正当与否的裁判者等基于权力的角色,又包括省际或部省县税收竞争的参与者这一源自权利的角色。法律规制税收竞争之所以可能,主要经由规范创制与行为限禁的复合路径,以系统规制发生机理迥异的省内、省际和部省县税收竞争。改进税收分成规则可以避免税收竞争过度,而限制或禁止有害税收竞争,则有助于维持税收竞争秩序。 Among the budgetary systems in various countries, the highest level of local budget units “province ” is connected to the central government and the provincial budget level, which has a significant guiding, promoting and guaranteeing function for local economic and social development. If the intergovernmental tax competition exceeds a reasonable limit, it may affect the efficiency of resource allocation, undermine the fair distribution of benefits, the legal regulation of the tax competition need is self-evident, and the legal regulation of the path design is a worldwide problem, the urgent need theory Research support For our country, provincial budget units are staggered to serve four distinct legal roles: they include both the makers of the tax sharing rules below the provincial level, the implementers of the county-level basic financial security policy, the judges who justify the tax competition in the province And other power-based roles, as well as the power-derived role of participants in tax competition in provincial or prefecture-level counties. The legal regulation of tax competition is possible, mainly through the standard path of creation and behavior of the composite path to systematically regulate the occurrence of different mechanisms within the province, provincial and provincial tax competition. Improving tax sharing rules can avoid over-competition in tax revenue, while restricting or prohibiting harmful tax competition helps to maintain order in tax competition.