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本文是关于阳明心学与胡塞尔现象学的一个比较研究。孟子提出的良心、良知、良能是密切相关,但涵义不同的三个观念:作为“用”的良能是作为“体”的良心的发用流行;而良知则是对良心及其良能的反身直观,本身就是良能的一种发挥。这就是说,良心与良知、良能是体用关系,良知与良能是知行关系。阳明心学的“良知”观念,浑言之,兼具良心、良能、良知的意义;析言之,则是指的与良心、良能相对的,作为反身直观的狭义良知。相应地,他的“致良知”就有了以下三个层次的展开:发动良知,这可以跟胡塞尔“本质直观”加以比较;发现良心,这可以跟胡塞尔“事情本身”亦即“纯粹意识”加以比较;发挥良能,这可以跟胡塞尔“意向活动”加以比较。
This article is a comparative study of Yangming’s psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology. The conscience, conscience and good energy proposed by Mencius are three concepts closely related but different in meaning: the good energy as the “use” is the popular use of conscience as the “body”; and the conscience is the conscience And its good counter-intuitive energy, itself is a kind of good energy to play. This means that conscience and conscience, good energy is physical relationship, conscience and good energy is the relationship between knowing and doing. The concept of “conscience” in Yangming’s mind is not only the conscience, good energy and the meaning of conscience but also the meaning of conscience and good energy as the narrow sense of conscience. Accordingly, his “consummate conscience” has the following three levels of development: the mobilization of conscience, which can be compared with Husserl’s “essential intuition”; the discovery of conscience, which can be followed by Husserl’s “ Things themselves ”, that is,“ pure consciousness ”to be compared; to play good energy, which can be compared with Husserl’s“ Intentional Activities ”.