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本文认为中央政府的信用担保其实是一种非排他性但有竞争性的公共资源,地方政府之间存在着竞相举债以至滥用公共资源的道德风险。作者在锦标赛模型基础上构建“赤字竞赛”模型,为解释我国大规模地方政府债务的形成提供新的视角。文章认为,只要中央政府无法实施有效的外部约束或惩罚机制,各级政府强烈的举债动机将使地方债务问题普遍存在,而且地方债务危机有可能在经济规模较小但赤字政策更为激进的地方政府率先爆发。
This paper argues that the credit guarantee of the central government is actually a non-exclusive but competitive public resource, and there is a moral hazard between local governments competing for debts and misusing public resources. Based on the model of the championship, the author constructs a “deficit contest” model, which provides a new perspective for explaining the formation of large-scale local government debts in our country. The article argues that as long as the central government can not implement effective external restraint or punishment mechanism, the strong debt motivations of all levels of government will make the problem of local debts ubiquitous, and the local debt crisis may be in a smaller economy but where the deficit policy is more radical The government broke out first.