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假装、佯装或欺骗都是我们生活中的常见现象,而且它们之间似乎存在某些特定的相似之处。但想要详细阐明这些现象究竟是什么,则并不是一件容易的事情。在本文中,笔者希望引入一些来自维特根斯坦的案例,以对这些现象进行哲学上的分析。从一种维特根斯坦式的角度看,所有这些现象都归属于一种特殊的语言游戏,这种游戏与其他一些更为基础性的游戏有着深刻的关联。事实上,对这些基础性游戏的熟知是进行假装的必要条件之一。此外,我们还需要依据不同的语境来决定需要做出哪些行动。因此在开始进行一场语言游戏之前,我们其实已经做出了某些并不属于该游戏本身的决定。
Pretend, pretend or cheat are all common phenomena in our lives, and there seem to be some specific similarities between them. However, it is not an easy task to elaborate on what these phenomena are. In this article, I hope to introduce some cases from Wittgenstein to conduct a philosophical analysis of these phenomena. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, all of these phenomena belong to a special kind of language game that is deeply linked to other more fundamental games. In fact, being familiar with these basic games is one of the prerequisites for pretense. In addition, we also need to decide what needs to be done based on different contexts. So before we started a language game, we actually made some decisions that did not belong to the game itself.