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本文探讨了在政治集权一经济分权的政府治理结构下,中国地方政府竞争、财政分权对劳动收入占比、资本深化的实际效应。在中国式分权的理论框架下,通过建立动态面板模型,采用广义矩估计(GMM)方法对此进行实证研究。分析表明:地方政府竞争是劳动收入占比下降、资本深化的重要制度性因素,直接效应较为明显。与已有研究不同,财政分权并非劳动收入占比下降与资本深化的直接原因,可能仅是制度前提。因此,中国劳动收入占比下降与资本深化在一定程度上是一种制度现象。
This paper explores the practical effects of competition and fiscal decentralization on the proportion of labor income and capital in China under the centralized and decentralized structure of government governance. Under the theoretical framework of Chinese decentralization, a dynamic panel model is established and a generalized moment estimation (GMM) method is used to conduct empirical research. The analysis shows that the competition of local governments is an important institutional factor that the proportion of labor income declines and the capital deepens. The direct effect is obvious. Different from previous studies, fiscal decentralization is not the direct reason for the declining proportion of labor income and the deepening of capital, but may be only the institutional premise. Therefore, the declining share of labor income and the deepening of capital in China are to some extent a system phenomenon.