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本文在银行的动态古诺竞争框架下研究了中小企业的融资问题。主要结论有:(1)尽管引入资本充足率监管可以减轻银行的道德风险,但是,经济可能会产生“融资困局”的情况:高的资本充足率要求使得银行投资不足,低的资本充足率使得银行投资过度,银行的投资量会在两种状态之间跳跃,因此无论怎样调节资本充足率要求都无法达到社会最优的投资量,从而产生社会福利损失。(2)银行过度竞争会使得“融资困局”更容易发生,并且增加社会福利损失。(3)引入外部的直接融资市场,并且降低直接融资的成本有助于解决“融资困局”的问题。
This paper studies the financing of SMEs under the framework of the dynamic Cournot competition in the bank. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) Although the introduction of capital adequacy regulation can reduce the bank’s moral hazard, the economy may have a “financing dilemma” situation: high capital adequacy requirements make the bank underinvestment, low capital Adequacy makes bank over-investment, bank investment will jump between the two states, so no matter how to adjust the capital adequacy requirements are unable to achieve the optimal investment in society, resulting in social welfare losses. (2) Excessive bank competition will make “financing difficulties ” more likely to occur, and increase social welfare losses. (3) Introducing an external direct financing market and reducing the cost of direct financing helps to solve the “financing dilemma” issue.