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贝叶斯方法论是从现代概率论的贝叶斯主义扩展和提炼而来的。它的意见收敛定理表明,随着证据的增加,验前概率的主观性和私人性将被验后概率的客观性和公共性所代替。按照贝叶斯定理改变置信度被称为动态合理性。然而,动态合理性依赖于条件化规则,这样,归纳法的合理性问题变成条件化规则的合理性问题。为条件化规则加以辩护的动态大弃赌方案的失败使豪森转向休谟和拉姆齐的立场,即只承认归纳推理的演绎合理性。本文着重对豪森关于休谟问题的这一观点给以分析和评述,并指出,沿着另一位贝叶斯方法论的创始人德菲耐蒂的方向,以意见收敛定理为基础,可望对休谟问题的解决作出实质性的贡献。
Bayesian methodology is extended and refined from Bayesianism of modern probability theory. The convergence theorem of opinion shows that with the increase of evidence, the subjectivity and personalness of the pre-test probability will be replaced by the objectivity and publicity of the post-test probability. Changing confidence according to the Bayesian theorem is called dynamic rationality. However, dynamic rationality relies on conditional rules, so that the rationality of induction becomes the rationality of conditional rules. The failure of the dynamic big-money-gamble that defended the conditioning rules turned Hussein’s position toward Hume and Ramsey, which admitted only the deductive rationality of inductive reasoning. This paper focuses on the view of Hausen on the Hume question and points out that along the direction of Defiance, the founder of another Bayesian methodology, based on the theorem of convergence of opinions, Hume’s resolution of the issue to make a substantive contribution.