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本文从法经济学“产权”这一核心视角出发,分析了专利制度运行失灵的两个根本缺陷:一是产权失灵;二是市场失灵。接着以“界权成本”这一新视角切入,从经济学家诺斯的理论出发,分析了专利的私税性质,提出专利寻租本质是国家为激励知识公共品的创造而将界定产权的应然价格与实际价格之间的差距以私人收取垄断租的权利形式部分让渡给专利权人。本文还提出了基于对专利征税的改进专利制度的建议:一是对专利权人专利获赔数额进行征税以遏制寻租式诉讼;二是税收专款用于专利局提高专利审查授权质量和加强专利信息公开的社会契约责任。
Based on the core perspective of law and economics “property rights ”, this paper analyzes two fundamental defects of the failure of the patent system: one is the failure of property rights and the other is the market failure. Then, starting from the new perspective of “Boundary costs ”, starting from the theory of Northrop Grumman, this paper analyzes the nature of the private tax and proposes that the essence of patent rent - seeking is to define the state in order to stimulate the creation of public goods The discrepancy between the due price of the property right and the actual price is to be assigned to the patentee by the part of the private right of monopoly rent. The paper also proposes the suggestion of improving the patent system based on the taxation of patents: firstly, taxing the amount of the patent owner’s patent claims to curb rent-seeking litigation; secondly, earmarking tax funds are used by patent offices to improve the quality of patent examination and authorization Strengthen the social contract responsibility for patent information disclosure.