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在由多主体组成的光伏用户群中,用户间存在光伏电量共享。然而,在现有的分布式光伏上网政策下,用户间的共享水平很低。为了提高用户间光伏电量共享水平,根据用户的用电特性,构建了光伏用户群内的多买方—多卖方格局。结合中国的分布式光伏上网政策,运营商作为主导者,以其收益最大化为目的,制定光伏用户群内部电价。用户作为跟随者,基于运营商发布的内部电价进行需求响应,最大化自身用电效益,用户需求响应的结果同时也会影响运营商的收益。通过分析该电力市场中运营商和用户的行为特性,提出了基于Stackelberg博弈的需求响应模型,并证明了该博弈均衡点的存在性和唯一性。算例结果表明,在该光伏用户群中,运营商通过制定内部电价,能够有效提高自身收益以及用户用电效益,并明显提升了光伏用户群内光伏电量共享水平,验证了所提模型的有效性。
Among the multi-subject PV users, PV power sharing exists among users. However, under the existing distributed PV access policy, the level of sharing among users is very low. In order to improve the sharing level of photovoltaic power among users, a multi-buyer-multi-seller structure within the photovoltaic user group is constructed according to the user’s electricity consumption characteristics. Combined with China’s distributed photovoltaic Internet access policy, operators as the leader, to maximize revenue for the purpose of developing PV users within the electricity price. The user, as a follower, performs the demand response based on the internal electricity price released by the operator to maximize its own electricity efficiency. The result of the user demand response also affects the operator’s profit. By analyzing the behavioral characteristics of operators and users in the electricity market, a demand response model based on Stackelberg game is proposed and the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point of the game are proved. The results of the example show that in this photovoltaic user group, operators can effectively increase their own revenue and user electricity efficiency by setting the internal electricity price, and significantly improve the sharing level of PV power in PV users, which verifies the effectiveness of the proposed model Sex.