本文以小麦为例,对政策性粮食竞价销售政策的有效性进行了考察。研究发现,竞价销售的拍卖价格与现货价格和期货价格之间存在协整关系,而且可以利用拍卖价格来解释现货价格的变化。同时,计划销售规模对小麦现货价格的影响很明显,而实际成交规模对小麦现货价格的影响却有限。这说明,竞价拍卖政策本身具有的信号功能要大于实际的市场供给功能。小麦现货价格的变化却直接影响着实际成交规模的变化。 This paper, taking wheat as an example, examines the effectiveness of the policy grain auction sales policy. The study finds that there is a cointegration relationship between the auction price of auction sales and spot price and futures price, and the auction price can be used to explain the change of spot price. At the same time, the impact of the planned sales scale on the spot price of wheat is obvious, but the actual transaction size has a limited impact on the spot price of wheat. This shows that the bidding auction policy itself has a signal function greater than the actual market supply function. Changes in the spot price of wheat have a direct impact on the actual transaction size changes.