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Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow, Research Institute for
World Ideological Trends under the Institute for International Strategic Studies,
Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. (National Academy of Governance)
Yang Jingying
School of Graduate Studies at the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC
(National Academy of Governance)
DOI: 10.19422/j.cnki.cn10-1398/d.2019.04.009
The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense on June 1, 2019 expounded America’s historic ties to the Indo-Pacific region, looked forward to and established the vision and principles of “one Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, analyzed the strategic picture for the region, and clarified the pluralistic challenges faced by the U.S. and the policy measures to tackle these challenges. Based on the text of IPSR, this essay gives an analysis and study of the historic evolution, policy measurement and restrictive factors of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific Strategy”.
Historic Evolution of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
The concept of “Indo-Pacific” was mostly seen in the field of marine science in early time, and later has been used in the study of ethnology. In the 21st century, more and more scholars turn their eyes to the Indo-Pacific region from the geopolitical perspective. “Indo-Pacific” as a geopolitical concept was first put forward by Indian strategist Gurpreet S. Khurana in 2007. After that, in March 2010, a researcher with German Marshall Fund of the U.S. named Daniel Twining put forward that India has a bigger role to play against the backdrop of the relative weakness of the U.S. and the rise of China, and advocated the establishment of Indo-Pacific partnerships covering India, Australia and Japan. In November 2011, the Lowy Institute of Australia, the Heritage Foundation of the U.S. and the Observer Research Foundation of India jointly issued the “Shared Goals, Converging Interests: a Plan for U.S.-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, which noted that “a formal trilateral dialogue…will help promote the Indo-Pacific as an area conducive to economic and political stability, security, free and open trade, and democratic governance”.
Japan is the first country to pay attention to the Indo-Pacific region at the policy level. In as early as August 2007, Prime Minister Abe noted in his speech at the Indian Parliament that “once Japan and India join hands, ‘the great Asia’ will probably develop into a huge network covering the entire Pacific including the U.S. and Australia”. Later, both India and Australia mentioned the Indo-Pacific at the policy level. The U.S. concern at the Indo-Pacific region began from the Obama Administration, yet more focused on the Asia-Pacific region, with the “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” Strategy as a testimony. Trump’s main concern was also the Asia-Pacific region when he was still the president-elected. It was after he came into office that he began to turn his eyes to Indo-Pacific. Especially after 2018, the Trump Administration has gradually turned the Indo-Pacific vision into policies, making it practical and clear, and since then the Indo-Pacific Strategy has frequently appeared in the official discourse of the United States. The IPSR released in June 2019 as Trump’s first systematic regional strategy towards Indo-Pacific region serves as a symbol of the substantial advancement of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy is in essence an outcome of the continuous readjustment of the focus of U.S. national security strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security strategy has been aimed at safeguarding its position as the “sole super power” as well as “preventing the emergence of new opponents”. During this period, the U.S. continued to expand in Europe and Asia in the wake of the Cold War victory. In the late 1990s, against the background of the dominant strategic advantage of NATO’s eastward expansion in Europe, the U.S. began to tilt (rather than shift) its strategic focus to Asia. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Bush Administration’s global counter-terrorism strategy has largely put the process on ice. At that time, the U.S. was mired in two wars. In addition, its national strength was weakened by the 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in the failure of sustainable strategic layout of its global expansion. In view of the easing of the security situation in Europe and the enhancement of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the Obama Administration put forward the strategy of “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” and promoted the “Eastward Shift” of U.S. diplomatic strategic focus, which is a concrete embodiment of the readjustment of the national security strategy of the U.S. against the backdrop of its weakening hegemony. The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a continuation and consolidation of this strategic readjustment.
Three Pillars of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
The IPSR puts forward three major efforts to sustain the influence of the U.S. to achieve its regional objectives, namely, preparedness, partnerships and the promotion of a networked region. The preparedness means achieving peace through strength and employing effective deterrence to ensure the realization of the U.S. strategic goals. The partnerships refer to reinforcement of the U.S. commitment to its established alliances and partners, while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners who share the “respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law”. The promotion of a networked region means to strengthen and evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. In concrete, the advancement of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy mainly covers three spheres, namely, the military, political and institutional. I. Strengthen the building of military force and maintain strategic advantage over competitors
As a country advocating force, the U.S. is well aware of the ultimate significance of maintaining a strong military force in safeguarding its hegemonic interests. It has waged wars repeatedly in the process of rising to dominate the world. Therefore, one of the core elements of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is to strengthen the building and layout of military forces in order to build a more lethal and intimidating army. The then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan indicates in the preface to the IPSR that the Department of Defense, alongside the U.S. allies and partners, will ensure its combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region as well as the prioritized investments in lethality against high-end adversaries.
To that end, the U.S. has embarked on the deployment in four areas. One is to re-establish the main objective of the military strategy, namely, to deal with the strategic competition among the major powers as the main content; secondly, to increase the military expenditure and expand the military configuration in the Indo-Pacific region; thirdly, to increase the frequency and intensity of military activities, for example, the U.S. has strengthened the maritime “freedom of navigation” in the region; fourthly, to update the concept of operations and develop expeditionary capabilities. It is necessary to note that the U.S. is also consciously introducing its allies outside the Indo-Pacific region (such as France, the United Kingdom, etc.) into the region, and encourages them to participate individually or jointly in the regional affairs so as to enhance the U.S. power in implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
II. Deepen alliances and partnerships to strengthen U.S. influence and competitiveness in the region
The Trump Administration is highly critical of America’s alliances, yet that does not mean the U.S. will abandon this strategic tradition. In fact, both the National Security Strategy Report and the Defense Strategy Report emphasize the importance of deepening the alliances and partnerships in safeguarding the regional and global interests of the U.S. Adhering to this tone, the IPSR points out that “U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in our long-standing security alliances – the bedrock on which our strategy rests. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match”. To this end, while continuing to strengthen its alliances in the region, the U.S. is taking steps to expand partnerships with Singapore, New Zealand, Mongolia and India. Meanwhile, the U.S. is pursuing communication and coordination with emerging partners such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal, and strengthening security relationships with Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. The U.S. strengthening of alliances and partnerships has not only political significance, but also obvious economic significance. The Trump Administration stresses that the U.S. alliances and partnerships must be based on mutual respect and equal responsibility and adhere to the responsibility-sharing strategy. On the one hand, it aims to reduce the burden on the huge alliance system built by the U.S., and on the other hand, it also hopes to strengthen its competitiveness against China in the Indo-Pacific region by integrating the economic strength of its allies and partners.
III. Promote the development of a networked region and build institutional balancing forces
By expanding the existing bilateral relations into trilateral or multilateral arrangements (such as the U.S.-Australia-Japan trilateral mechanism and the U.S.-ASEAN multilateral mechanism) as well as encouraging the internal security interaction in Asia (such as Japan-India defense and security ties and Japan-India-Australia trilateral dialogues) and the development of a targeted partnership, the U.S. has tried to build a U.S.-centered regional networking architecture in Indo-Pacific in order to counterbalance the rise of regional powers. “Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing network of alliances and close partnerships that promote interoperability and coordination.”
The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy takes the promotion of building a networked regional architecture as one of its major pillars, and facilitated the development of a quadrilateral dialogue mechanism among the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. Diplomats from the four countries met in Manila of the Philippines for the first time in many years on 12 November, 2017, They all expressed their commitment to deepening cooperation based on shared democratic values and principles, and they also discussed on further strengthening the rule-based order in Indo-Pacific. According to Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy, the U.S. will seek to promote cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. At the fourth dialogue in Bangkok on June 1, 2019, officials from the four countries reiterated their commitment for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on shared values and principles.
All in all, the Trump Administration’s main way to advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy can be summed up in three words, that is, all-fields, whole-of-government, and all-dimensions. The “all-fields” means a combination of political, economic, security, governance and other policy measures. The “whole-of-government” requires that the Department of Defense maintain coordination with other government departments for strengthening consensus and joining forces. The “all-dimensions” refers to the employment of various forces both inside and outside the region, such as regional alliances and partnerships, regional mechanism (e.g. ASEAN) as well as allies and partners outside the region. Restrictive Factors to U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
From putting forward the Indo-Pacific Vision in 2017 to developing the Vision into the Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018 and to the release of the IPSR in 2019, the Trump Administration has been continuously advancing the process of “shift to the East” of the U.S. diplomatic focus. In view of the geo-strategic significance of the region, it is inevitable for the U.S. to continue its deepening of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, whether this Strategy can achieve expected effect still remains quite uncertain, and it is still restricted by many factors at home and abroad.
I. Restrictions of Domestic Political and Economic Situation
On the one hand, the ever-growing political differentiation in the U.S. has formed an obstacle to the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Since Trump came into office, there have been constant political disputes in the U.S., and Democrats have tried repeatedly to initiate impeachment proceedings. The differences between the two parties over immigration policies have led to the longest “closed” record in the history of U.S. federal government. On the other hand, the U.S. economic situation has also restricted the advancement of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The current economic uncertainty in the U.S. has increased, and the protectionist policies adopted by the Trump Administration, in particular its “trade war” against China, have increased the likelihood of the U.S. economy falling into recession. Meanwhile, as a result of the huge debt burden, the U.S. has failed to make adequate economic investment in the Indo-Pacific region, which has limited its economic competitiveness and influence in the region and at the same time caused certain doubts from regional countries for its ability to advance the Strategy.
II. Tackling Inherent Contradictions of Indo-Pacific Strategy
There are at least three inherent contradictions of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The first one is that between the ruling concept of “America first” and the promotion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The ruling concept of “America first” determines that the Trump Administration’s foreign policy serves the U.S. national interests, especially the material interests. Aiming at building a “free and open” order in the region, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is the provision of public goods, which means that the U.S. has to bear corresponding costs. If the cost is too high, it will run counter to the Trump Administration’s ruling concept of “America first”, thus resulting in uncertainties of the implementation of the Strategy. The second contradiction is the one between deepening the alliances and forcing the allies to take more responsibilities. While emphasizing the importance of the regional alliances, the U.S. continues to put pressure on its allies, requesting them to take more responsibilities. That is clearly not what the regional allies want to see and may create a gap between them and the U.S. The third one is the contradiction between regional networking architecture and unstable and uncoordinated alliances. The regional networking architecture is based on the upgrading of the existing alliances and strengthening of the interaction between the allies. However, the bilateral alliances built by the U.S. in Asia have formed certain path dependence, and an institutional inertia of strengthening mutual relations between allies and partners through the U.S. has been developed. In addition, the allies have different interests and even contradictions, which pose major challenges for the formation of the new pattern. III. Integration of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and other national strategies in the region
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy cannot be advanced without support by India, Japan and Australia, three pivot countries. However, judging from the current situation, the regional strategies of these three countries are hardly in conformity with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
India is regarded as one of the important pillars of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Some scholars even noted that the key to the success of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is the strategic direction of India. Although having responded positively to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, India does not want to be used as a pawn for the U.S. to counterbalance China. Instead, it wishes to use the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy for realizing its own national interests, that is, to promote the “Act East Policy” for more deeply participating in the affairs of the Pacific region. Moreover, the major objective of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is to maintain its strategic advantage in the region, so it is difficult for the U.S. to fully trust India, a potential major power. From this point of view, the long-term competition between the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific region is a predictable strategic picture.
Japan is the most active country in supporting the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, in November 2018, Abe Shinzo changed Japan’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” into the “Indo-Pacific Concept” at a meeting between the government and the ruling party, weakening the implication of cooperating with the U.S. in counterbalancing China. In the same way, Australia has its own interests and policy limits in cooperating with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is evident in its China policy. On the one hand, Australia is ready to cooperation with the Strategy, while on the other hand, Australia has a high economic dependence on China, its largest trading partner. Therefore, with regard to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, Australia’s approach is to embrace and at the same time emphasize China’s indispensable role in tackling global challenges, which limits Australia’s room for cooperating with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
IV. Constraints of security situation in other regions
It is difficult for the United States, a country with global strategic interest, to devote all its energy and resources to one certain region. Like the “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” Strategy, if the U.S. fails in sustaining enough economic growth and fiscal surplus, but simply transfers its strategic input in other regions to the Indo-Pacific, the changes of the security situation in other regions will become one of the major constraints to the implementation of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. In fact, the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is still something like stocks readjustment. From this perspective, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is being advanced with an obvious dependence on external factors, which also increases the vulnerability and uncertainty of the Strategy.
World Ideological Trends under the Institute for International Strategic Studies,
Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. (National Academy of Governance)
Yang Jingying
School of Graduate Studies at the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC
(National Academy of Governance)
DOI: 10.19422/j.cnki.cn10-1398/d.2019.04.009
The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense on June 1, 2019 expounded America’s historic ties to the Indo-Pacific region, looked forward to and established the vision and principles of “one Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, analyzed the strategic picture for the region, and clarified the pluralistic challenges faced by the U.S. and the policy measures to tackle these challenges. Based on the text of IPSR, this essay gives an analysis and study of the historic evolution, policy measurement and restrictive factors of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific Strategy”.
Historic Evolution of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
The concept of “Indo-Pacific” was mostly seen in the field of marine science in early time, and later has been used in the study of ethnology. In the 21st century, more and more scholars turn their eyes to the Indo-Pacific region from the geopolitical perspective. “Indo-Pacific” as a geopolitical concept was first put forward by Indian strategist Gurpreet S. Khurana in 2007. After that, in March 2010, a researcher with German Marshall Fund of the U.S. named Daniel Twining put forward that India has a bigger role to play against the backdrop of the relative weakness of the U.S. and the rise of China, and advocated the establishment of Indo-Pacific partnerships covering India, Australia and Japan. In November 2011, the Lowy Institute of Australia, the Heritage Foundation of the U.S. and the Observer Research Foundation of India jointly issued the “Shared Goals, Converging Interests: a Plan for U.S.-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, which noted that “a formal trilateral dialogue…will help promote the Indo-Pacific as an area conducive to economic and political stability, security, free and open trade, and democratic governance”.
Japan is the first country to pay attention to the Indo-Pacific region at the policy level. In as early as August 2007, Prime Minister Abe noted in his speech at the Indian Parliament that “once Japan and India join hands, ‘the great Asia’ will probably develop into a huge network covering the entire Pacific including the U.S. and Australia”. Later, both India and Australia mentioned the Indo-Pacific at the policy level. The U.S. concern at the Indo-Pacific region began from the Obama Administration, yet more focused on the Asia-Pacific region, with the “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” Strategy as a testimony. Trump’s main concern was also the Asia-Pacific region when he was still the president-elected. It was after he came into office that he began to turn his eyes to Indo-Pacific. Especially after 2018, the Trump Administration has gradually turned the Indo-Pacific vision into policies, making it practical and clear, and since then the Indo-Pacific Strategy has frequently appeared in the official discourse of the United States. The IPSR released in June 2019 as Trump’s first systematic regional strategy towards Indo-Pacific region serves as a symbol of the substantial advancement of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy is in essence an outcome of the continuous readjustment of the focus of U.S. national security strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security strategy has been aimed at safeguarding its position as the “sole super power” as well as “preventing the emergence of new opponents”. During this period, the U.S. continued to expand in Europe and Asia in the wake of the Cold War victory. In the late 1990s, against the background of the dominant strategic advantage of NATO’s eastward expansion in Europe, the U.S. began to tilt (rather than shift) its strategic focus to Asia. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Bush Administration’s global counter-terrorism strategy has largely put the process on ice. At that time, the U.S. was mired in two wars. In addition, its national strength was weakened by the 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in the failure of sustainable strategic layout of its global expansion. In view of the easing of the security situation in Europe and the enhancement of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the Obama Administration put forward the strategy of “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” and promoted the “Eastward Shift” of U.S. diplomatic strategic focus, which is a concrete embodiment of the readjustment of the national security strategy of the U.S. against the backdrop of its weakening hegemony. The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a continuation and consolidation of this strategic readjustment.
Three Pillars of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
The IPSR puts forward three major efforts to sustain the influence of the U.S. to achieve its regional objectives, namely, preparedness, partnerships and the promotion of a networked region. The preparedness means achieving peace through strength and employing effective deterrence to ensure the realization of the U.S. strategic goals. The partnerships refer to reinforcement of the U.S. commitment to its established alliances and partners, while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners who share the “respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law”. The promotion of a networked region means to strengthen and evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. In concrete, the advancement of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy mainly covers three spheres, namely, the military, political and institutional. I. Strengthen the building of military force and maintain strategic advantage over competitors
As a country advocating force, the U.S. is well aware of the ultimate significance of maintaining a strong military force in safeguarding its hegemonic interests. It has waged wars repeatedly in the process of rising to dominate the world. Therefore, one of the core elements of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is to strengthen the building and layout of military forces in order to build a more lethal and intimidating army. The then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan indicates in the preface to the IPSR that the Department of Defense, alongside the U.S. allies and partners, will ensure its combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region as well as the prioritized investments in lethality against high-end adversaries.
To that end, the U.S. has embarked on the deployment in four areas. One is to re-establish the main objective of the military strategy, namely, to deal with the strategic competition among the major powers as the main content; secondly, to increase the military expenditure and expand the military configuration in the Indo-Pacific region; thirdly, to increase the frequency and intensity of military activities, for example, the U.S. has strengthened the maritime “freedom of navigation” in the region; fourthly, to update the concept of operations and develop expeditionary capabilities. It is necessary to note that the U.S. is also consciously introducing its allies outside the Indo-Pacific region (such as France, the United Kingdom, etc.) into the region, and encourages them to participate individually or jointly in the regional affairs so as to enhance the U.S. power in implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
II. Deepen alliances and partnerships to strengthen U.S. influence and competitiveness in the region
The Trump Administration is highly critical of America’s alliances, yet that does not mean the U.S. will abandon this strategic tradition. In fact, both the National Security Strategy Report and the Defense Strategy Report emphasize the importance of deepening the alliances and partnerships in safeguarding the regional and global interests of the U.S. Adhering to this tone, the IPSR points out that “U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in our long-standing security alliances – the bedrock on which our strategy rests. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match”. To this end, while continuing to strengthen its alliances in the region, the U.S. is taking steps to expand partnerships with Singapore, New Zealand, Mongolia and India. Meanwhile, the U.S. is pursuing communication and coordination with emerging partners such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal, and strengthening security relationships with Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. The U.S. strengthening of alliances and partnerships has not only political significance, but also obvious economic significance. The Trump Administration stresses that the U.S. alliances and partnerships must be based on mutual respect and equal responsibility and adhere to the responsibility-sharing strategy. On the one hand, it aims to reduce the burden on the huge alliance system built by the U.S., and on the other hand, it also hopes to strengthen its competitiveness against China in the Indo-Pacific region by integrating the economic strength of its allies and partners.
III. Promote the development of a networked region and build institutional balancing forces
By expanding the existing bilateral relations into trilateral or multilateral arrangements (such as the U.S.-Australia-Japan trilateral mechanism and the U.S.-ASEAN multilateral mechanism) as well as encouraging the internal security interaction in Asia (such as Japan-India defense and security ties and Japan-India-Australia trilateral dialogues) and the development of a targeted partnership, the U.S. has tried to build a U.S.-centered regional networking architecture in Indo-Pacific in order to counterbalance the rise of regional powers. “Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing network of alliances and close partnerships that promote interoperability and coordination.”
The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy takes the promotion of building a networked regional architecture as one of its major pillars, and facilitated the development of a quadrilateral dialogue mechanism among the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. Diplomats from the four countries met in Manila of the Philippines for the first time in many years on 12 November, 2017, They all expressed their commitment to deepening cooperation based on shared democratic values and principles, and they also discussed on further strengthening the rule-based order in Indo-Pacific. According to Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy, the U.S. will seek to promote cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. At the fourth dialogue in Bangkok on June 1, 2019, officials from the four countries reiterated their commitment for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on shared values and principles.
All in all, the Trump Administration’s main way to advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy can be summed up in three words, that is, all-fields, whole-of-government, and all-dimensions. The “all-fields” means a combination of political, economic, security, governance and other policy measures. The “whole-of-government” requires that the Department of Defense maintain coordination with other government departments for strengthening consensus and joining forces. The “all-dimensions” refers to the employment of various forces both inside and outside the region, such as regional alliances and partnerships, regional mechanism (e.g. ASEAN) as well as allies and partners outside the region. Restrictive Factors to U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy
From putting forward the Indo-Pacific Vision in 2017 to developing the Vision into the Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018 and to the release of the IPSR in 2019, the Trump Administration has been continuously advancing the process of “shift to the East” of the U.S. diplomatic focus. In view of the geo-strategic significance of the region, it is inevitable for the U.S. to continue its deepening of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, whether this Strategy can achieve expected effect still remains quite uncertain, and it is still restricted by many factors at home and abroad.
I. Restrictions of Domestic Political and Economic Situation
On the one hand, the ever-growing political differentiation in the U.S. has formed an obstacle to the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Since Trump came into office, there have been constant political disputes in the U.S., and Democrats have tried repeatedly to initiate impeachment proceedings. The differences between the two parties over immigration policies have led to the longest “closed” record in the history of U.S. federal government. On the other hand, the U.S. economic situation has also restricted the advancement of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The current economic uncertainty in the U.S. has increased, and the protectionist policies adopted by the Trump Administration, in particular its “trade war” against China, have increased the likelihood of the U.S. economy falling into recession. Meanwhile, as a result of the huge debt burden, the U.S. has failed to make adequate economic investment in the Indo-Pacific region, which has limited its economic competitiveness and influence in the region and at the same time caused certain doubts from regional countries for its ability to advance the Strategy.
II. Tackling Inherent Contradictions of Indo-Pacific Strategy
There are at least three inherent contradictions of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The first one is that between the ruling concept of “America first” and the promotion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The ruling concept of “America first” determines that the Trump Administration’s foreign policy serves the U.S. national interests, especially the material interests. Aiming at building a “free and open” order in the region, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is the provision of public goods, which means that the U.S. has to bear corresponding costs. If the cost is too high, it will run counter to the Trump Administration’s ruling concept of “America first”, thus resulting in uncertainties of the implementation of the Strategy. The second contradiction is the one between deepening the alliances and forcing the allies to take more responsibilities. While emphasizing the importance of the regional alliances, the U.S. continues to put pressure on its allies, requesting them to take more responsibilities. That is clearly not what the regional allies want to see and may create a gap between them and the U.S. The third one is the contradiction between regional networking architecture and unstable and uncoordinated alliances. The regional networking architecture is based on the upgrading of the existing alliances and strengthening of the interaction between the allies. However, the bilateral alliances built by the U.S. in Asia have formed certain path dependence, and an institutional inertia of strengthening mutual relations between allies and partners through the U.S. has been developed. In addition, the allies have different interests and even contradictions, which pose major challenges for the formation of the new pattern. III. Integration of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and other national strategies in the region
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy cannot be advanced without support by India, Japan and Australia, three pivot countries. However, judging from the current situation, the regional strategies of these three countries are hardly in conformity with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
India is regarded as one of the important pillars of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Some scholars even noted that the key to the success of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is the strategic direction of India. Although having responded positively to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, India does not want to be used as a pawn for the U.S. to counterbalance China. Instead, it wishes to use the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy for realizing its own national interests, that is, to promote the “Act East Policy” for more deeply participating in the affairs of the Pacific region. Moreover, the major objective of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is to maintain its strategic advantage in the region, so it is difficult for the U.S. to fully trust India, a potential major power. From this point of view, the long-term competition between the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific region is a predictable strategic picture.
Japan is the most active country in supporting the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, in November 2018, Abe Shinzo changed Japan’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” into the “Indo-Pacific Concept” at a meeting between the government and the ruling party, weakening the implication of cooperating with the U.S. in counterbalancing China. In the same way, Australia has its own interests and policy limits in cooperating with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is evident in its China policy. On the one hand, Australia is ready to cooperation with the Strategy, while on the other hand, Australia has a high economic dependence on China, its largest trading partner. Therefore, with regard to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, Australia’s approach is to embrace and at the same time emphasize China’s indispensable role in tackling global challenges, which limits Australia’s room for cooperating with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
IV. Constraints of security situation in other regions
It is difficult for the United States, a country with global strategic interest, to devote all its energy and resources to one certain region. Like the “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” Strategy, if the U.S. fails in sustaining enough economic growth and fiscal surplus, but simply transfers its strategic input in other regions to the Indo-Pacific, the changes of the security situation in other regions will become one of the major constraints to the implementation of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. In fact, the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is still something like stocks readjustment. From this perspective, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is being advanced with an obvious dependence on external factors, which also increases the vulnerability and uncertainty of the Strategy.