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实验和现实数据均显示,即使在一次性的交往过程中人类也会惩罚非合作者。即使这种“利他性惩罚”可以解释人类社会较高水平的合作行为,但是它也会产生一个演化悖论:现有模型认为非亲缘个体之间的利他性合作只有在小规模群体中才可以稳定地演化,因而用这一模型来解释利他性惩罚的演化时就会产生一个结果,即人们不会自己承担成本去惩罚别人,并为大量非亲缘的成员提供利益。然而,本文认为,利他性合作与利他性惩罚之间是不对称的,这就使得利他性惩罚可以在一次性和匿名交往中演化,并使利他性惩罚和利他性合作都得以维持。
Both experimental and real data show that humans punish non-partners even in one-off interactions. Even though such “altruistic punishment ” can explain the higher level of cooperative behavior in human society, it also produces an evolving paradox: existing models consider that the altruistic cooperation between unrelated individuals occurs only in small groups So that it can evolve steadily. Therefore, using this model to explain the evolution of altruistic punishment leads to the conclusion that people will not bear the costs to punish others and provide benefits to a large number of non-related members. However, this article argues that there is an asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment, which makes it possible for altruistic punishment to evolve in one-off and anonymous exchanges and to maintain altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation.