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文章旨在探讨法国2014年Florange法案对于公开要约收购行为的规制:原则上肯定了目标公司的管理层采取反收购措施的合法性,反而将股东大会对于反收购措施的审批设置为任意性规范,而非旧法中的强制性规范。持股超过两年的老股东其投票权自动增倍的“一股两票”之设计,也旨在强化政府长期持股不卖出的国有控股权以及长期不出卖股票的老股东对公司的控制。同时,一系列收购前义务程序的设置,则让整个收购进程显得冗长不堪,企业委员会对于收购进程的把控力更上一层。
The article aims to explore the French Florange Act 2014 on the public offer of the tender offer: in principle affirmed the management of the target company to take the anti-takeover measures the legitimacy of the General Assembly instead of approval of anti-takeover measures set to arbitrary norms, Not the old norms of the norms. The “one-share two-vote” design that automatically increases the voting power of old shareholders who have held more than two years of stock rights also aims at strengthening the state-owned controlling stock that the government does not sell for a long time and the old shareholders who do not sell stocks for a long time Company control. At the same time, a series of pre-purchase voluntary procedures set the whole acquisition process into a lengthy embarrassment, and the business commission took the control over the acquisition process to the next level.