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中国矿区农村有一个特点,村庄是在国有煤矿产权控制和影响下存在和发展的。一方面,国有煤矿可以促进村庄发展,另一方面,村矿合谋又可能会损害村民利益。村庄发展悖论的产生有着深刻的社会根源,煤矿的国有产权造成的资源公地悲剧和村庄中“社会势力”性质的村干部相互作用,最终损害了村民利益,由此引发村民为维护自身权益而进行不断的斗争。研究表明,村庄的发展取决于村企的合作,尤其要有代表村民利益的村治精英的存在。文章通过个案研究的方法,以产权理论和合谋理论为视角,对山西省煤矿国有产权控制(影响)下的村庄发展进行实证分析,该问题的研究对中国矿区农村的发展和治理经验具有普遍的理论和现实意义。
There is a characteristic of China’s rural mining area, which exists and develops under the control and influence of property rights of state-owned coal mines. On the one hand, state-owned coal mines can promote the development of villages; on the other hand, the collusion of mines may damage the interests of villagers. The paradox of village development has profound social roots. The tragedy of resources and commons caused by the state-owned property rights of coal mines interacts with the village cadres of the nature of “social forces” in the villages, which ultimately damages the interests of the villagers, thus causing the villagers to maintain Their own rights and carry out continuous struggle. The research shows that the development of the village depends on the cooperation between the village and the enterprise, especially the existence of village elites who represent the interests of the villagers. This article empirically analyzes the village development under the control (influence) of state-owned property right in Shanxi Province from the perspective of property rights theory and collusion theory through a case study approach. The research of this issue is common to the experience of rural development and management in China’s mining areas Theoretical and practical significance.