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我国主要旅游景区门票价格偏高引起了社会的广泛关注,政府财政补贴是缓解“涨价风”的有效渠道。为了研究财政补贴在景区门票定价过程中的影响作用,本文以动态博弈分析方法为基础,在考虑政府不同的补贴方式下,进行景区与消费者之间的序贯博弈分析。研究发现,成本补贴方式优于价格补贴,且政府对景区成本补贴的程度对均衡门票的高低有重要影响,但只有当补贴使得景区的最优价格与消费者的最优价格相等时,才能获得博弈的纳什均衡解。
China’s major tourist attractions ticket prices caused widespread concern in the community, the government financial subsidies to ease the “price hikes” an effective channel. In order to study the effect of financial subsidies on the pricing of scenic spot tickets, this paper analyzes the sequential game between scenic spots and consumers based on the dynamic game theory and the different government subsidies. The study found that the cost subsidy is better than the price subsidy, and the extent of government subsidy to the cost of the scenic area has a significant impact on the level of the ticket. However, only when the subsidy makes the optimal price of the scenic spot equal to the optimal price of the consumer Game Nash Equilibrium Solution.